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I. INTRODUCTION
Antidumping (AD) laws provide a remedy against the controversial trade
practice known as dumping. Dumping refers to the act of selling goods in a
foreign market at prices below their normal value. Normal value is the term
of art describing the “fair price” of a good. The concept of normal is always
controversial, but the rationale behind antidumping laws is that a government
may offset the effect of dumping by imposing an antidumping duty when the
“dumped” imports cause material injury to the domestic producers.
In recent years, many scholars have raised concerns about the
protectionist use of antidumping remedies and have called for reform.
Among those scholars is Harvard Law Professor Mark Wu. In his 2012
article “Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants,” Professor Wu makes six
proposals to reform World Trade Organization (WTO) law on antidumping.1
One of his proposed ideas that he describes as “radical” is the requirement
that all complaints for dumping be accompanied by proof of the underlying
unfair trade practice that enables dumping.2 In support of his proposal, Wu
correctly points out that existing WTO laws do not require petitioners to
prove or explain the nature of the unfair trade practice that makes dumping
possible.3 They only need to prove that the price of the dumped goods is
below their “normal value.”4 This makes AD subject to abuse because there
are various “methodological manipulations” available for calculating the
normal value.5 Wu predicts that the proposed requirement for proof of the
underlying unfair conditions would make it more difficult for a country to
abuse AD to “punish” foreign producers engaging in price differentiation for
strategic purposes.6 Although Wu may be right about the short-term
potential effect of this reform proposal, I do not agree that his approach is the
correct one to handle the problem of abusive AD.
1
Those proposals consist of three “no regret” proposals and three “radical” proposals. See
Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 157–71 (2012).
2
Id. at 166. Among the six proposals Wu makes, this Article focuses only on this
particular proposal.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Wu also suggests that this reform would have two additional benefits. First, it would
draw greater attention to the unfair trade practices that still exist in the world. Second,
governments would exercise greater restraint in using AD, because it would involve accusing
its trade partners of engaging in unfair trade practices. Such accusation might heighten
political tension. Id. at 166–67.
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My analysis of his reform proposal focuses on the effect of AD rhetoric
on the development of the lax legal standards in AD regulations that Wu
identifies as the main reason for AD’s popularity as a protectionist remedy.7
I argue that Wu’s reform proposal is problematic because (1) it affirms the
existing rhetoric of AD, and (2) it introduces the unsettled concept of
fairness into the WTO framework. The existing rhetoric of AD is
fundamentally flawed, and it only contributes to the establishment of the lax
legal standards that make AD laws so susceptible to protectionist use.
Introducing the concept of fairness does not solve this problem, because the
concept is highly controversial. Moreover, it emphasizes the punitive nature
of dumping. Denouncing the act of dumping only encourages abusive use of
antidumping laws. Therefore, Wu’s proposal does not address the
fundamental cause of the problem which is the discrepancy between the
rhetoric and the actual use of AD. In this regard, I briefly discuss how the
European Union (EU) addressed this problem of the discrepancy between the
rhetoric of AD and its actual use. After that, I propose a new rhetoric of AD
that is more consistent with the measure’s actual use and explain how this
new rhetoric can help reduce its abuse. Finally, I briefly describe how the
new rhetoric can be incorporated into WTO law and what impact this would
be likely to have in the long run.
II. THE EXISTING RHETORIC OF AD
Wu’s reform proposal is likely to have been influenced by the common
notion that AD is, by definition, a response to unfair trade practices.
According to Jackson, “the distinction between responses to ‘fair trade’ and
those to ‘unfair trade’ has long been understood.”8 Jackson states that the
distinction is drawn between escape mechanisms, such as safeguards, and
trade remedies, such as AD and countervailing duties (CVD). The former
may be exercised regardless of the existence of any actionable unfair trade
practice, while the latter are designed “to offset the effects of the ‘unfair’
actions, and perhaps to go further and have a sort of ‘punitive’ effect, to
inhibit such actions in the future.”9

7

Id. at 107–13.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 247 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis added).
9
Id.
8

AND

POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
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In the United States, supporters of AD argue that it ensures fair trade by
offsetting market distortions caused by foreign governments.10 Therefore,
today’s AD is viewed, even by its supporters, as remedial rather than
punitive. However, the notion that dumping is a condemnable act remains
strong. Clear evidence of this notion is found in Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), which states that contracting
parties recognize that injurious dumping is “to be condemned.”11 Such
strong language is not found, for example, in the provisions dealing with
CVDs or safeguards.12 In fact, this is the only time the word condemn is
used in the entire GATT 1947 agreement.13 Therefore, one can easily infer
that AD is founded on the rhetoric that dumping should be condemned as an
unfair trade practice.
The notion that dumping is a condemnable act is a century old.14 When
Canada adopted the world’s first AD law in 1904, then-Canadian minister of
finance, the Honorable W.S. Fielding, described dumping as a method of
trade adopted by the producers in high-tariff countries to “obtain command
of a neighboring market” by “put[ting] aside all reasonable consideration
with regard to the cost or fair price of the goods.”15 He then proposed to
address this “evil” through the use of AD duties.16
In the United States, AD law developed as an extension of antitrust law.17
Hence, the notion that AD is a remedy against the “evils of monopoly
power” was even stronger in the United States than in Canada.18 Although
AD later developed into a body of law distinct from antitrust laws, its
rhetoric remained more or less the same—i.e., “finding and punishing
foreign unfairness.”19 It is therefore conceivable that similar rhetoric was
10
Brink Lindsey, The U.S. Antidumping Law Rhetoric Versus Reality, TRADE & POL’Y
ANALYSIS, Aug. 1999, at 2, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tpa007.pdf.
11
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
12
Id. arts. VI, XIX.
13
See generally id.
14
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 251.
15
Michael J. Finger, The Origins and Evolution of AD Regulation 3–4 (Country Econ.
Dep’t of the World Bank, Pol’y Res. Working Paper Series 783, 1991).
16
Id. at 4.
17
Id. at 11.
18
Id. According to Finger, in the United States, “policing the evils of monopoly power”
was not only the rhetoric of AD but also the mechanics of it, because the “early U.S.
antidumping regulations were, in substance, extensions of antitrust law.”
19
Id. at 17.
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used when the United States put the subject of AD on the table for inclusion
in the GATT 1947.20 According to Finger, “[t]he United States provided the
basic working document for the international trade organization negotiations,
and this suggested charter contained most of the provisions on AD that are
now in GATT Article VI.”21 Therefore, it is no coincidence that Article VI
reflects the century-old rhetoric that dumping should be condemned.
However, this rhetoric is flawed because it does not reflect how AD is used
in practice.
III. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RHETORIC OF AD AND ITS ACTUAL
USE
A. Historical Use of AD
According to Finger, there is not much historical evidence to suggest that
“antidumping ever had a scope more particular than protecting home
producers from import competition.”22 He says that although the Canadian
government succeeded in passing the world’s first AD law using the rhetoric
that dumping is unfair, the rhetoric did not reflect the true intention of the
Canadian government, which was protectionism.23 In this regard, AD was a
brilliant invention, because unlike tariffs it allowed the Canadian government
to retain some selectivity over the provision of protection.24 Finger argues
that the protectionist intent of the Canadian government was evident in the
standard of proof contained in the first Canadian AD law, which states that
[w]henever it appears to the satisfaction of the minister of
customs . . . that . . . the actual selling price [of an article] to the
importer in Canada . . . is less than the fair market
value . . . such article[ ] shall . . . be subject to a special duty of
customs equal to the difference between such fair market value
and such selling price.25

20
It must be noted, however, that neither Article VI of the GATT 1947 nor the U.S. law on
AD (except for the 1916 Antidumping Act) is concerned with the intent of the dumping party.
This raises the question of genuineness regarding the rhetoric of AD.
21
See Finger, supra note 15, at 24–25.
22
Id. at 1.
23
Id. at 14–15.
24
Id. at 3–11.
25
Id. at 4.
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This standard is almost identical to the standard used in today’s AD laws26
and reflects virtually no concern for the unfairness of the price discrimination
at issue.
The situation was slightly different in the United States. The early U.S.
AD laws captured the spirit of the proposed rhetoric better than the Canadian
law. For example, the Antidumping Act of 1916, until it was repealed in
2004,27 provided for both civil and criminal liabilities for importing foreign
goods into the U.S. market at a price substantially below the “actual market
value” with the “intent to injure, destroy, or prevent the establishment of an
industry in the United States or to restrain competition.”28 However, the
1916 act was never popular, mainly due to “the onerous predatory intent
requirement,”29 which was consequently dropped in the 1921 act.30
According to Finger, a series of changes in the standard of proof
eventually transformed the AD laws around the world into a tool of
protectionism.31 He asserts that the most straightforward expression of the
newly emerged “soft” standard is the “best information available” clause
now found in Article 6.8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (ADA).32 Article 6.8
states that “[i]n cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or
otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period
or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final
determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the
facts available.”33 Finger argues that this clause represents a shift from a
26

Article VI:1 of the GATT 1947 defines dumping as introducing products of one country
into the commerce of another country at less than the “normal value” of the products. Article
VI:1(a) provides a presumption of dumping “if the price of the product exported from one
country to another . . . is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.” GATT 1947, supra
note 11, art VI:1.
27
See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS136 United States – AD Act of 1916, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (Nov. 11, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dis_ /cases_/d
s 136_e.htm
28
See Finger, supra note 15, at 12–23; see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE,
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 260 (3d ed. 2005).
29
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 245.
30
See Finger, supra note 15, at 18.
31
Id. at 20–22.
32
Id. at 21. Finger cites a provision of the GATT antidumping code which is now found in
Article 6.8 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. See Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 6.8, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. [hereinafter ADA].
33
See ADA art. 6.8, supra note 32.
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legal to an administrative standard that allowed the administrators of the AD
laws to quickly follow the “changing political pressures for protectionism.”34
B. Recent Use of AD
In the 1980s, AD law began to emerge as the “weapon of choice” for
protectionism by major developed countries.35 For example, in 1980, the
United States issued eighty-four antidumping orders.36 This number
increased to 197 by 1990.37 During this period, AD was also used heavily by
other Western countries. Between 1980 and 1990, the four trading powers
that are now known as the “traditional users” of AD, the U.S., Canada,
Australia, and the EU, were responsible for bringing 95% of all AD cases
worldwide.38 According to Bhala, AD had become a “potent weapon for
protectionists” in those countries.39
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations did not change the situation.
Although the Uruguay Round imposed significant restrictions on the use of
nontariff instruments, AD and other contingent forms of protectionism
survived.40 The adoption of the ADA raised hope for keeping AD under
control, but the ADA was grossly insufficient to prevent protectionists from
using AD as a nontariff barrier to trade.41 According to Wu, the four
traditional users enshrined their “quasi-protectionist” legal standard into the
ADA to ensure that they could continue to use AD to protect their
industries.42 Despite the adoption of the ADA, AD has been by far the most
popular trade remedy among the various forms of contingent protection
available under the WTO framework.43 Between 1995 and 2012, there were
4,230 AD initiations reported to the WTO Committee on Antidumping.44
34

Finger, supra note 15, at 21. It must be noted however that Annex II of the ADA
provides some procedural protections against the abusive use of the administrative power set
out under Article 6.8 of the ADA.
35
Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 3, 3–4
(1995).
36
Id. at 3.
37
Id. at 4.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Wu, supra note 1, at 107.
41
See Bhala, supra note 35, at 5.
42
Wu, supra note 1, at 109.
43
Id. at 107–08.
44
See WTO Statistics on Antidumping, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
adp_e/adp_e.htm [hereinafter AD Statistics].
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During the same period, 2,719 AD measures were imposed.45 According to
Wu’s calculations, AD duties accounted for more than 90% of legal
contingent protection measures enacted worldwide in the last five years.46
Interestingly, AD is no longer used exclusively by the Western powers.
“Between 1985 and 2000, over fifty new countries . . . adopted antidumping
laws.”47 Currently, more than forty WTO members, including many
developing countries, use AD actions consistently.48 India, for example, has
was the leading initiator of AD proceedings every year from 2005 to 2012 in
terms of the number of cases filed.49 Other “top users” of AD actions
include China, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Turkey.50 This does not
mean that the traditional users have curtailed their use of AD. Those
countries are still the leading users of AD in terms of trade size, because their
markets are considerably larger than are those of the developing countries.51
In other words, the use of AD has become a truly global phenomenon.
The worldwide proliferation of AD laws and the increasing popularity of
AD actions in recent years have alarmed many economists and legal
scholars.52 The clear consensus among the scholars is that AD is not used in
accordance with its original rhetoric, which is remedying unfair trade
practices.53 Instead, many countries are simply using AD laws to protect
their domestic industries. For example, one study suggests that at most 2%
of the EU’s antidumping cases were targeted to address predatory pricing.54
Therefore, there is a clear discrepancy between the original rhetoric of AD
laws and their actual use.
IV. THE REASON FOR THE DISCREPANCY: LAX LEGAL STANDARDS
As Wu identifies, the lax legal standards embedded in the ADA are the
primary source of the discrepancy between the rhetoric of AD and its actual

45

Id.
Wu, supra note 1, at 103.
47
Id. at 117.
48
See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 333 (4th
ed. 2013).
49
See AD Statistics, supra note 44. India and the EU tied for first in 2006.
50
See id.
51
Id.
52
See Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 155–57 (2012).
53
Id. at 156.
54
Wu, supra note 1, at 110.
46
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use.55 These lax legal standards affect both the determination of dumping
and the injury required under the ADA for the imposition of an AD duty.56
A. Dumping Determination
Article 2.1 of the ADA defines dumping as introducing a product “into
the commerce of another country at less than its normal value” and provides
for a presumption of dumping when the export price of a good is below “the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product . . . in
the exporting country.”57 This standard is heavily criticized for having no
economic rationale. Many scholars argue that the only economic rationale
for AD is to combat predatory pricing.58 However, price differentiation does
not necessarily mean predatory pricing. For example, under U.S. antitrust
law most courts have ruled that only prices below the seller’s average
variable costs (AVCs) are predatory.59 These decisions have some economic
rationale because AVCs represent the minimum price at which firms can sell
their goods without incurring short-term losses.60 Therefore, firms would not
sell their products below their AVCs unless they had some ulterior
motives—i.e., predatory ones. Article 2.1 clearly sets a different standard.
The price of a good in “the ordinary course of trade” usually represents the
seller’s average total costs (ATCs) plus some profit. A firm may decide to
lower the price of its goods in a foreign market because it has not yet
established a good reputation in that market or because the economic
environment in that market is different from that in the home market.61 Such
decisions may be perfectly rational to the extent that the foreign price is
above the seller’s AVCs because such a price would not cause any shortterm loss. Therefore, inferring predatory intent in those circumstances is
problematic. However, the ADA does not even have a requirement for a
particular intent to impose AD duties.62

55
56
57
58

63.

59

See id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
See ADA, supra note 32, art. 2.1 (emphasis added).
See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 260; see also Zheng, supra note 52, at 160–

See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
60
See ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 161 (2013).
61
See Wu, supra note 1, at 111.
62
See generally ADA, supra note 32.
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The standard set out in Article 2.1 does not help determine the intent of
the seller engaging in dumping or describe the effect of dumping. Although
Article 3 provides that only injurious dumping should be remedied,63 the act
described as dumping in Article 2.1 does not necessarily result in injury to
the domestic industry in the importing country. This is because the fair value
of a good, or its price in the ordinary course of trade in the home country,
does not provide any information about the competitive environment in the
foreign market. In other words, whether a seller sells its products in a
foreign market at a price below or above its home price is not indicative of
whether the producers in that foreign market can compete with the seller.
The only economic significance of the home market price in the ordinary
course of trade is that it may be indicative of the comparative advantage of
the home country in producing the good. Therefore, the only reasonable
interpretation of the Article 2.1 definition of dumping would be that
“dumping” is the act of selling a good below the price that is indicative of the
comparative advantage of the exporting country. In other words, the
standard set out in Article 2.1 stipulates that the members of the WTO can
impose an AD duty on a good that is priced to be more competitive than is
indicative of the comparative advantage of the exporting because the
members had agreed to liberalize their trades only to the extent necessary to
enjoy the benefits of the comparative advantages of each other and no more.
However, in order for this interpretation to be valid, the following conditions
must be met: (1) the market in the home country must be a perfect one and
(2) the price of a good always represents the long-run market equilibrium.
The producers in a perfect market cannot make any profit in the long run
because there is no entry barrier.64 Competitors enter the market as long as
there is a potential for profits, and the increased competition lowers the price
until all profits are completely depleted.65 Hence, the long-run price in a
perfect market represents the true comparative advantage of the producers in
that market, which is their ATCs. However, most economists would agree
that such a perfect market rarely exists in practice and that the price of a
good often does not represent the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, the price
in the ordinary course of trade in exporting country does not necessarily
indicate of the comparative advantage of that country in producing the good.
Hence, there is no economic rationale behind the Article 2.1 standard.
63
64
65

Id. art. 3.5.
See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 60, at 186, 187.
Id.
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In addition to the unsoundness of Article 2.1 standard, the various
alternative methods of calculating the “normal value” permitted under
Article 2.2 are also problematic. Under this article, there are three
circumstances in which countries are allowed to use alternative methods:
(1) where the goods are not sold in the course of business in the home
market; (2) where less than 5% of the goods are sold in the home market; and
(3) where “the particular market situation” in the home market does not
allow a “proper comparison.”66 Under these circumstances, countries are
allowed to calculate the normal value: (a) based on the price of the good in a
third country; (b) using “the cost of production” in the home county “plus a
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for
profits”; or (c) “using [the] factor costs in surrogate countries” if the good is
from a country with a non-market economy.67 According to Wu, these
exceptions and alternatives allow the administrators of AD to manipulate the
numbers so that the normal value is “sufficiently inflated” to support a
finding of dumping.68 Therefore, the lax legal standards allow countries to
use AD as a protectionist tool.
B. Injury Determination
The laxness is also evident in injury determination. Article VI(1) of
GATT 1947 provides that dumping “is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry.”69 Article 3 of the ADA states that determination of injury must be
based on “positive evidence” and involve an objective evaluation of “all
relevant economic factors.”70 However, the ADA does not require actual
proof of economic injury. Instead, the administrators of AD can presume
injury if certain price and volume requirements are met. Under Article 3.2,
the following questions are relevant in determining the effect of dumping on
the price of a good: (1) “whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports” and (2) “whether the effect of such
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price

66
67
68
69
70

ADA, supra note 32, art. 2.2.
Id.; Wu, supra note 1, at 112.
Wu, supra note 1, at 112.
GATT 1947, supra note 11, art. VI(1) (emphasis added).
ADA, supra note 32, art. 3.
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increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.”71
This is an incredibly vague standard.
The volume requirement is not too onerous either. The only requirement
is that at least 3% of the total imports of the good must come from the
country that is subject to the AD investigation.72 This requirement is so low
it is easily satisfied.73
Article 3.5 provides that there must be a causal relationship between
dumping and injury, but it does not provide any clear standard.74 The
determination of causality only needs to be “based on an examination of all
Such evidence may include declining factory
relevant evidence.”75
utilization, increasing inventories, or other signs of financial hardship
coinciding with an increase of cheaper foreign imports. Therefore, under the
vague requirement, governments can easily prove causality based on
concurrence of events.76 These provisions again give wide discretion to
administrators of AD, allowing them to use AD for protectionist purposes.
V. THE REASON FOR THE LAX LEGAL STANDARDS: THE RHETORIC OF AD
The lax legal standards found in the ADA are attributable to the rhetoric
of AD. As Wu points out, the lax legal standards have been enshrined in the
ADA by traditional users of AD that support their positions with the very
same rhetoric they used to adopt their domestic AD laws.77 Therefore, the
fact that the ADA has legal standards that make AD susceptible to
protectionist use is not a coincidence. There are two ways the rhetoric
supports the lax legal standards: (1) it attaches a negative connotation to the
word dumping and (2) it incorporates the concept of fairness, which is
extremely vague.

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. art. 3.2.
Id. art. 5.8.
Wu, supra note 1, at 113.
ADA, supra note 32, art. 3.5.
Id.
Wu, supra note 1, at 113.
See id. at 109.
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A. Is AD Punitive or Remedial?
There is no doubt that AD is now a remedial measure, not a punitive
one.78 The Antidumping Act of 1916 provided for both civil and criminal
liabilities for dumping provided that there was a predatory intent, but the act
was rarely used.79 Every once in a while, an argument is made in the U.S.
Congress that a law should be enacted to establish a private right of action
against dumping, but it rarely gets anywhere.80
However, the rhetoric of AD still attaches a negative connotation to the
word dumping by defining it as an unfair trade practice. This derogatory
element then allows the proponents of AD to stand on the “rhetorical high
ground” during a policy debate and to argue as if countries have some
inherent rights in AD.81 According to Zheng, this “democracy deficit”
prevents “the real questions about trade protectionism from being scrutinized
and debated in a meaningful manner.”82
Therefore, while the actual AD regulations are remedial, the rhetoric
behind the regulations may be punitive. This is critical because the fact that
the regulations are remedial allows adoption of the administrative standard of
proof instead of the rule-of-law standard. This administrative standard of
proof then permits various methodological manipulations by the
administrators. At the same time, the rhetoric focusing on the punitive
nature of dumping supports low barriers to proving the manipulated AD.
B. What is Fair?
Another way the rhetoric has contributed to the establishment of lax legal
standards is that, although the rhetoric condemns dumping as an unfair trade
practice, there is no consensus on the definition of unfairness in international
trade. In other words, the adoption of lax legal standards was inevitable
because no one was absolutely certain how unfair dumping should be
defined.

78

See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 1 (suggesting that the practice of AD is more punitive than
the rhetoric implies).
79
See Finger, supra note 15, at 12–13.
80
See Roger P. Alford, Why a Private Right of Action Against Dumping Would Violate
GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 696, 698–700 (1991).
81
Zheng, supra note 52, at 180.
82
Id.
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To illustrate the diversity of the current theories of fairness in
international trade and how difficult it would be to achieve a consensus
among them, some of the best-known ones are introduced below.
1. Unfair Competition
One of the early arguments adopted by the proponents of AD was that
price discrimination in international trade is per se an “unfair competition.”83
Barceló explains that this concept had its origin in tort law, in which
plaintiffs used the concept “to obtain relief against various deceptive and
unscrupulous business practices such as plagiarism, theft of trade secrets,
fake or deceptively imitative labeling, or disparagement of another enterprise
or product.”84 However, Barceló also points out that there is no policy
justification for outlawing all instances of price discrimination.85 Moreover,
he opines that such a concept, if applied in international trade, “would grant
domestic [producers] a commercial property right in [regard to] existing
customers or price levels” that would “wholly swallow” the doctrine of
liberal trade.86 Even though this doctrine, if applicable, would provide the
greatest coverage for AD, it does not seem to be popular today.
2. Market Efficiency
Another concept of fairness is based on the theory of market efficiency.
The neo-liberalist argument for government intervention to prohibit
monopolies and “other anti-competitive situations” has long been accepted.87
This approach suggests that anti-competitive behaviors should be condemned
as unfair practices because they raise prices, stifle innovation, and generally
distort market efficiency.88 This theory presents the soundest basis for
antitrust law.
The early rhetoric of AD law was not much different from that of antitrust
law. In both Canada and the United States, the rhetoric was based on
83

John J. Barceló III, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade—the United States and the
International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 496, 502 (1972). Jackson opined that
the notion that sales at different prices to different persons are somehow unfair might be “a
leftover from medieval notions of ‘fair price.’ ” JACKSON, supra note 8, at 253.
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Barceló, supra note 83, at 502.
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fighting against the evils of foreign trusts.89 The only difference was that AD
law addressed predatory pricing at the international level, whereas antitrust
law was concerned with domestic predatory pricing.90 However, the gap
between the rhetoric and actual AD regulations is enormous. In Canada, the
gap was already wide when the country adopted its first AD law in 1904.91
The adopted law contrasted sharply with the rhetoric in terms of standards of
proof that shifted the focus of the law from condemning monopolies to
limiting imports.92 The gap was much narrower in the United States when it
adopted its first AD law in 1916.93 However, because the adopted law failed
to meet the hopes of its protectionist supporters, a series of changes occurred
to make it a tool for ordinary protection.94 The wide gap between the early
rhetoric of AD and what the actual regulations bar is today means that the
concept of fairness based on the traditional neo-liberalist model no longer
provides strong support for AD. Trebilcock and Howse argue that predatory
pricing is the only economic justification for AD, but “AD laws are illdesigned to identify and penalize true international predatory pricing.”95
Dumping and AD were considered from different angles when strategic
trade theory emerged in the 1980s.96 As economists started to recognize the
role of governments in promoting national welfare by creating conditions of
imperfect competition through mechanisms such as tariffs, subsidies,
dumping, and other related market distortions, they also started to recognize
the role of AD as a relief against the detrimental effects of dumping.97
Therefore, the economic justification for AD today includes the concept of
fairness based on the notion of market efficiency supported by the traditional
neo-liberalist argument against monopolies and the strategic trade theory that
dumping is a strategic market distortion.98

89

See generally Finger, supra note 15.
See MASTEL, supra note 87, at 65.
91
See Finger, supra note 15, at 16.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 17.
95
See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 260.
96
See MASTEL, supra note 87, at 65; see also PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 275–96 (5th ed. 2000).
97
MASTEL, supra note 87, at 72–74.
98
Id. at 65.
90

2014]

RETHINKING THE RHETORIC OF ANTIDUMPING

473

3. Reciprocity
Yet another concept of fairness in international trade is the notion of
“reciprocity.”99 Two aspects of this theory are worth noting. First,
according to Bhagwati, lack of reciprocity does not necessarily mean an
adverse impact on national welfare.100 However, he states that policy
questions are rarely decided without reference to “the role of emotions.”101
Therefore, “lack of reciprocity in free trade is generally considered,
regardless of its impact on national welfare, as simply unfair.”102 Second,
there is a more rational basis for reciprocity as grounds for fairness. Because
the most efficient allocation of resources can be achieved when all countries
adhere to free trade, a departure by one country must be condemned.103
Moreover, a rule-based system such as the GATT requires symmetric or
uniform rights and obligations on all of its members.104
4. Level Playing Field
Closely related to the concept of fairness based on reciprocity is the idea
of the “level playing field.”105 According to Jackson, this concept “evokes
the notion of economic activity as a game, and the idea that competition in
this game should be defined according to a set of rules that all participants
share.”106 The underlying logic is that the level playing field achieves
99
See generally Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Fair Trade, Reciprocity, and Harmonization: The
Novel Challenge to the Theory and Policy of Free Trade, in PROTECTIONISM AND WORLD
WELFARE 17 (Dominick Salvatore ed., 1993).
100
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Some versions of the level-playing-field theory are incredibly similar to the concept of
fairness based on reciprocity. For example, Lindsey and Ikenson explain level-playing-field
theory as an argument that “international competition should be subject to certain agreed-upon
‘rules of the game’ according to which some sources of competitive advantage—trade
barriers, subsidies, and other market-distorting government policies—are condemned as
unfair.” See, e.g., BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE
DEVILISH DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW 18 (2003). Notice that the version of level-playingfield theory I introduce here does not presume that there is a set of agreed-upon rules that
decide which sources of competitive advantage are unfair. It only presumes that all parties
have agreed to compete under the same set of rules so that no one has any unfair advantage
over others.
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fairness among the participants by ensuring each participant has an equal
chance to succeed.
This approach, although similar to fairness based on reciprocity, yields to
a broader definition of unfair activity, because while reciprocity deals with
only those policies that are mutually agreed upon by the contracting states,
the level-playing-field approach deals with all policies that are different
among countries. Therefore, in the international trade setting, the concept of
a level playing field can provide a basis for numerous unfair-advantage
claims. Almost any policy in the exporting country that deals with issues
such as the environment, labor relations, or tax can be interpreted as giving
unfair advantages to producers in the importing country if the policies in the
two countries differ.107 The home country then might demand harmonization
of such policies or imposition of corrective measures, such as AD or CVD.108
The problem is that the overreaching nature of the level-playing-field
argument enables a variety of protectionist interventions that are a threat not
only to the doctrine of free trade but also to the principle of national
sovereignty.109 According to Bhagwati, the demands for fair trade in this
sense “have grown out of hand.”110
This brief survey of the different schools of thought concerning fairness
in international trade illustrates how diverse they are. Some have evolved in
the legal discipline, while others have evolved in other fields of social
science such as economics and sociology. Some are interdisciplinary. These
schools often differ wildly in their foci, in that the concept of fairness is often
analyzed in relation to important but variant values such as justice, individual
rights, efficiency, reciprocity, and equality. The extreme diversity in the
approaches taken to explain what fairness is in international trade means that
a consensus on the definition of fairness is unlikely to emerge any time soon.
As Jackson notes, this fundamental disagreement about what should be
107
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Jackson points out that the problem of level-playing-field theory arises because “societies
and their economic systems differ so dramatically that what seems ‘unfair’ to members of one
society may seem perfectly fair to those of another society.” JACKSON, supra note 8, at 248.
However, I do not agree with this point because, under the level-field-theory, unfairness arises
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fair by another society. The demands for harmonization or imposition of corrective measures
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called “unfair” is why “the distinction between fair and unfair trade has
become increasingly blurred” today.111 Therefore, the rhetoric based on
fairness cannot provide an adequate guideline for the policy to be adopted.
VI. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THE DISCREPANCY
There are several ways to deal with the discrepancy between the rhetoric
of AD and its actual use. One of them is Wu’s reform proposal. Another
interesting approach worth discussing is the “Community interest”
requirement under the AD laws of the EU. Lastly, I propose that a new
rhetoric of AD could address the discrepancy issue.
A. Wu’s Reform Proposal
Wu proposes to make two changes to WTO laws:
First, Article 5.2 of the ADA should be amended to require that
petitioners, when filing an antidumping case, must provide
evidence of unfair practice(s) that enable the defendant to
engage in dumping. Second, Article 12.2 of the ADA should
be amended to require that government authorities, in their
rulings, explain which of the unfair trade practices alleged by
the petitioner were found to exist and how those practices
enabled dumping.112
Wu claims that these changes would make abusive use of AD difficult,
and that countries would no longer be able to impose AD duties for purely
protectionist purposes.113 He also claims that his proposal would ensure that
AD remains a sanction in situations in which “unfair trade practices actually
exist.”114 He then suggests that such a situation exists when a foreign
country is enjoying a sanctuary home market for any number of reasons,
such as “(a) the government’s unwillingness to enforce competition laws; (b)
excessively high tariff rates for the product, as compared to other WTO
members’ rates; (c) non-tariff barriers to entry; (d) the government’s implicit
guarantee against continuing losses; and (e) market-distorting industrial
111
112
113
114

JACKSON, supra note 8, at 247.
Wu, supra note 1, at 166.
Id. Wu also suggests that these changes will have two additional benefits.
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policy.”115 In other words, these are some of the unfair practices that Wu
provides as examples of the practices that give rise to application of AD
duties. It is not clear which concept of fairness he uses to devise this list, but
all the items seem to qualify as unfair practices under the concept of fairness
based on either reciprocity or the level playing field.
Wu seems to suggest that the unfairness of dumping derives from the
unfairness of the underlying conditions that make such dumping possible. If
he is not suggesting this, then he may be proposing that an imposition of AD
duty should only be dependent on the unfairness of the underlying
conditions, not on the unfairness of dumping itself. If the position Wu takes
is the former, then one must examine whether the correlation between the
unfairness of dumping and the unfairness of the underlying factors enabling
dumping is a perfect one. For example, some predatory pricing practices
considered dumping by many scholars and practitioners may be unassociated
with any underlying factors that are unfair.116 Furthermore, there can be
situations in which a foreign producer engages in price discrimination strictly
for strategic purposes and, therefore, such a practice should not be
considered dumping, though there may happen to be underlying unfair
conditions that contribute to that producer’s ability to engage in such pricing.
If the position taken by Wu is the latter, it is unclear why he is only
concerned with the unfairness of the underlying conditions. Maybe he is
trying to avoid affirming the traditional rhetoric of AD because its flaws are
evident, or he is also trying to make the point that AD is rarely used today to
address the unfairness of dumping. Alternatively, perhaps he is trying to
bring the current AD laws into conformity with some particular type of
rhetoric he finds reasonable. It is also plausible that his approach is purely
pragmatic, and he simply does not care about the rhetoric of AD. In any
event, whether he is focusing on the fairness of AD or the fairness of the
underlying trade practices, his proposal is subject to the following criticisms.
1. Criticisms
I find Wu’s reform proposal problematic because: (1) it affirms the old
rhetoric of AD as a remedy against unfair trade practices and (2) it suggests
115

Id.
For example, sellers without established market base or reputation in a foreign market
may decide to sell their goods below the market cost, to “induce consumers to sample their
goods for the first time, as a marketing strategy.” In this situation, there would be no
circumstances that are particularly unfair. TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 48, at 357.
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that the concept of fairness should formally be introduced to and
incorporated into WTO law.117
a. Affirmation of the Existing Rhetoric
Rhetoric is important because it reflects the objective of proposed policies
and provides a clear guideline for the form and structure of the regulations to
be adopted. Therefore, the success of a policy depends on its rhetoric.
However, the current rhetoric of AD is problematic because (1) it does not
properly reflect the true intent of policymakers or the actual use of AD and
(2) its focus on the unfair nature of dumping allows for the adoption of the
lax legal standards that make AD susceptible to manipulation.
i. Rhetoric vs. Reality
Even in its very early days, the rhetoric of AD never really reflected the
true intentions of the policymakers. In many countries, AD laws were born
out of the necessity of dealing with the protectionist political pressure from
particular industries or producers.118 AD laws, combined with flexible rules
for custom valuation, simply provided a unique form of protectionism that
could be applied selectively.119 The notion that dumping was an unfair trade
practice that needed to be condemned was nothing more than an attractive
slogan adopted by protectionists. Therefore, it is futile to attempt to bring
today’s AD laws in conformity with their original rhetoric.
Even today, there is little evidence that national governments are using
AD to combat unfair trade practices abroad or that they even desire to use
AD for such purposes. In fact, the widespread abuse of AD as an ordinary
protectionist mechanism better reflects the true expectation of most national
governments.
This means that any reform proposal to curtail the
effectiveness of AD as a protectionist tool is likely to be forcefully resisted
by national governments. Wu must understand this point well because he

117
Note that although GATT 1947 uses the expression “to be condemned,” it does not
explicitly define dumping as an unfair trade practice. The Anti-Dumping Agreement also
does not refer to dumping as an unfair trade practice, and there is no test for determining the
unfairness of an activity. See generally GATT 1947, supra note 11; ADA, supra note 32; see
also K.D. RAJU, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON ANTI-DUMPING: A
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describes his proposal as “radical.”120 However, he seems to think that this
resistance can be overcome.
Wu argues that the U.S. and EU should consider reforming AD laws
because although the existing global AD regime still benefits the traditional
users (i.e., they are still the “top” users in terms of trade size); “the balance
of benefits” will soon flip as the developing countries start to explore the full
potential of the protectionist uses of AD.121 According to Wu, now is the
time for reform because developing countries such as China and India still
appear willing to raise the bar for the use of AD, considering “the immense
scale of [AD] sanctions levied against their exporters and their internal
political economy.”122 In other words, the developing countries may still
“trade long-term advantage for concrete near-term gains.”123
Wu might be right that now it is in the interest of both traditional and new
users of AD to make radical reforms that ultimately eliminate the current
uses of AD. However, if that is true, would it not be better to simply
eliminate AD laws altogether? AD laws have been the subject of heavy
criticism for decades, and many scholars argue that these laws should be
replaced by mechanisms such as harmonized antitrust laws or should simply
be repealed.124 If we are given the opportunity to eliminate AD, why would
we want to create another mechanism that inherits the name “antidumping”
but does something else, considering the possibility that the new mechanism
might become just as problematic as its predecessor has? This concern is
justified because the new AD regime employs the same rhetoric based on the
controversial notion of fairness that led to the adoption of lax legal standards.
ii. Punitive vs. Remedial
The current AD regime is susceptible to abuse because its rhetoric
focuses on the unfairness of dumping. The notion that AD is a “good thing”
because it condemns the unfairness of dumping allowed the adoption of lax
legal standards that made AD susceptible to manipulation. If the rhetoric of
AD did not focus so much on the punitive nature of dumping, today’s AD
120
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regime might be equipped with more abuse-conscious regulations such as
those dealing with the requirement for compensation and maximum periods.
In this regard, the traditional rhetoric is inconsistent with the other two
“radical” reform proposals offered by Wu: (a) making it more difficult to
extend AD duties and (b) requiring compensation for sustained AD duties.125
Wu suggests that there are three ways to make the extension of AD more
difficult. First, Article 11 of the ADA can be amended to require that the AD
duty be removed upon proof that the unfair trade practice that justified it has
ceased to exist.126 Second, WTO law can be amended to require that the
sunset reviews are subject to the same procedures and methodologies as is
the initial AD investigation.127 Third, AD duties can be made subject to only
a limited number of extensions.128 Although the first two ways do not clash
with the traditional rhetoric of AD, the last one does. As long as AD is based
on the grounds that dumping is unfair, there is no justification to limit its use
simply because it is overused. In other words, abusive use provides grounds
for restraint but heavy use does not. Wu claims that requiring explanation of
the underlying unfair trade practices would prevent AD from being used
abusively.129 If that is true, then there would be no justification for limiting
the number of extensions as long as the underlying unfairness persists.
A similar argument can be made about his proposal to require
compensation for sustained AD duties. In fact, he acknowledges that no
compensation is justified for the application of AD duties to counter unfair
practices because those duties represent a form of restitution for
“problematic behavior, namely dumping.”130 However, he argues that
compensation should be required to provide incentive to withdraw AD duties
when the underlying unfair trade practices are terminated.131 It is
questionable, though, that such incentive provides enough justification for
requiring compensation while AD duties are levied to condemn unfair trade
practices. If so, almost anything that has a negative impact on the country
that imposes AD duty can replace the requirement to pay compensation
because it would also incentivize the country to remove the duty as soon as
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possible. Such a line of pragmatic thinking does not provide a coherent
policy justification.
Interestingly, Wu claims that his proposal requiring compensation would
reduce the discrepancy between current international laws governing AD and
those governing safeguards.132 He says that his proposal would shrink the
gap between the two tools of contingent protection, which should be
welcomed by the scholars who contend that safeguards should become the
primary means of contingent protection.133 Ironically, while he proposes to
make the mechanics of AD similar to those of safeguards, he proposes to
affirm the difference in their rhetorics by engraving the concept of fairness
into WTO law.
b. Introduction of the Concept of Fairness into WTO Law
Wu’s reform proposal is also problematic because it introduces a fairness
test into the WTO regulations on AD. As mentioned earlier, the definition of
fairness is hardly settled. Various theories and models have evolved under
diverse intellectual frameworks. Part of the reason AD has evolved into an
instrument so susceptible to manipulation is that there is no consensus on
what fairness is. The vague definition of fairness gives a great deal of
discretion to policymakers to experiment with AD laws. For example, the
concept of fairness developed under the neoclassical economic theories
supports the application of AD against only predatory pricing, while the
concept of fairness based on a level playing field provides justification for
applying AD against virtually all types of price discrimination.134 Hence, the
adoption of lax legal standards was only possible because of a lack of
consensus on the definition of unfair dumping.
Wu proposes to introduce the concept of fairness formally into WTO law
by making amendments to the ADA. This is a risky proposition, and it does
not matter whether the application of the fairness test is required only for the
underlying factors enabling dumping or for both the underlying factors and
dumping itself. The result will be fierce debates and disagreements. Such
controversy will not only make the new AD regime susceptible to
manipulation by national governments to meet their needs but will also
create a new set of problems.
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For example, if policymakers adopt a concept of fairness that is too
narrow in scope, the newly adopted AD laws will not be effective in
addressing the problems at issue. On the other hand, if the concept of
fairness adopted has too wide of a scope, the newly adopted AD regime will
likely be considered a barrier to free trade.
As Bhagwati states, the notion of fair trade, based either on reciprocity or
on a level playing field, poses a great threat to trade liberalization.135 In this
sense, Wu’s proposition is particularly dangerous because it deals with the
fairness of the underlying factors rather than only the dumping itself. Almost
any country’s domestic policy can be interpreted as giving unfair competitive
advantages to that country’s exporters and thus become a basis for imposing
an AD duty.
In addition, every dispute over the application of the new AD regime will
be subject to arduous and unproductive debates over the question of the
unfairness of the underlying conditions enabling the dumping. In fact, the
complexity of this process will likely resemble that of determining the
countervailable subsidy for the application of CVD. Therefore, even if the
new regime reduces the number of complaints filed, the administrative costs
might not be reduced significantly.
Moreover, as the fundamental disagreement about the definition of
fairness persists, any accusation of dumping and underlying unfair trade
practices will likely create political tension. Wu seems to anticipate this
situation, but he only emphasizes its positive side by claiming that escalated
political tension will encourage governments to exercise greater restraint
when imposing AD duties.136 However, a trade instrument that is likely to
cause political tension whenever it is used cannot possibly be considered
good policy. A well-designed trade instrument should not be subject to
questions of legitimacy. In other words, a government’s decision to restrain
its use of AD should solely be based on an accurate analysis of the facts
surrounding the act of dumping under clear standards and not on the fear of
upsetting its trade partners.
In sum, Wu’s proposal to introduce a fairness test into the ADA is likely
to make the new AD regime subject to confusion, manipulation, continued
misuse and abuse, increased investigation costs, and political tension.
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B. The European Union’s Approach: Community Interest
The EU devised a creative solution to solve the discrepancy between the
rhetoric of AD and its actual use. In addition to the requirement for dumping
and injury, the EU added a third requirement: the “Community interest.”137
This requirement is set out in Articles 7(1) and 9(4) of the Council
Regulation No 1225/2009 with respect to provisional and definitive AD
measures, respectively.138 These provisions essentially state that AD duties
can only be imposed when “the Community interest calls for intervention” to
prevent the injury caused by the particular act of dumping in question.139
Article 21(1) of the regulation provides that the Community interest must be
determined “based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a
whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and
consumers.”140 In Apache Footwear, the General Court decided that the
Union Institutions have discretion to decide the method for weighing the
interests of the various parties affected by dumping.141
The approach taken by the EU does not represent a great departure from
the traditional rhetoric of AD. Its AD laws are still based on the notion that
dumping is unfair. Essentially, what the EU has done is to make sure that
overall economic efficiency is considered in determining the unfairness of
dumping. In other words, the EU has addressed the shortfalls of other
standards of fairness, such as the level playing field, which only focus on the
effect of dumping on the producers, by adopting standards of fairness that
focus on the effect of dumping on all interested parties in society.
The EU’s approach seems both conservative and pragmatic in that it does
not deviate too much from the existing WTO framework but addresses some
of the economic concerns associated with abuse of dumping. However, this
approach is not the ultimate solution to the discrepancy problem. Although
the Community interest requirement adds a third barrier to imposition of AD
duties, as Article 21(1) of the regulation and the decision in Apache
Footwear provide, the administrators of AD are still allowed to exercise
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wide discretion in determining what the Community interest is. Therefore,
the potential for manipulation and arbitrary use of the regulations still exists.
C. A New Rhetoric
The problem with both Wu’s proposal and the EU’s Community interest
approach is that they take the traditional rhetoric of AD as a given and only
deal with the inadequacy of the regulations. In other words, they do not
address the problem of the existing rhetoric but rather attempt to bring the
regulations into conformity with that rhetoric. This means that what started
as rhetoric has become classification. Everyone is trapped in the notion that
dumping is “unfair.”
However, when the discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality is caused
by flaws in the rhetoric, the rhetoric must be addressed first. To address the
problem of today’s abusive use of AD, the traditional notion that dumping is
unfair must be abandoned completely. Any argument for AD must clearly
(1) acknowledge that AD is a form of protectionism and (2) prove that,
despite its protectionist nature, AD still serves an important function in
international trade.
Acknowledging the protectionist nature of AD is important for several
reasons. First, it ensures that a proper discussion is undertaken to prevent
abuse. Lax legal standards can no longer be justified on the grounds that
dumping is unfair. Second, it eliminates the rhetorical high ground for the
advocates of AD and ensures that all parties affected by dumping, including
consumers and producers, can join the debate. Third, prolonged use of AD
will likely be seen as an unreasonable barrier to trade liberalization, and
therefore permanent use of AD will no longer be justified.
Even a protectionist measure can be justified if it serves a useful function.
For example, safeguards are allowed under the WTO framework because
they serve the important function of providing a temporary escape
mechanism.142 The benefit of a temporary escape mechanism in trade
liberalization has been well discussed by scholars.143 AD can also be
justified if it serves an important function. One of the important functions of
AD is to provide a temporary relief from trade liberalization, i.e., a safety
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valve. There are two models of safety valves that explain the role of AD in
international trade.144
1. Political Support Safety Valve
The first model is called the “political support safety valve.” This model
suggests that AD provides an effective political bargaining tool to
governments during a time of trade liberalization.145 In other words, AD can
be used to gain or maintain political support when a government is
negotiating a trade agreement with another country that proposes to remove
or reduce the existing trade barriers.
According to Sykes’ public choice analysis of AD laws, governments
reserve unilateral opt-out regimes against the contingency that the discrete
effects of trade liberalization in particular sectors would result in political
unsustainability.146 This is even true when the opt-out regimes may cause a
negative impact on consumers that is greater than the value of the protection
they afford to producers and result in an overall reduction in national
welfare.147 Under the public choice theory, governments are more concerned
about the impact of trade liberalization on producers than on consumers
because the former are better organized and more politically influential than
are the latter.148
All contingent trade remedies can provide a political support safety valve,
but AD provides a particularly effective one because of its high degree of
selectivity.149 AD can thus be justified on the basis of its role as a political
support safety valve helping governments relieve the political pressure
generated by the negative consequences of trade liberalization.
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2. Temporary Adjustment Safety Valve
The second model of the safety valve theory that provides support for AD
is called the “temporary adjustment safety valve.”150 This theory states that
when domestic producers are suddenly exposed to foreign competition, they
need some temporary protection to “get their act together.”151
According to Jackson, a sudden increase in imports may harm certain
domestic producers,152 even while it benefits the whole economy in the long
run. Therefore, those producers facing increased competition due to imports
are forced to adjust by either improving their competitiveness or shifting
their resources from the production of the competing products into the
production of non-competing ones.153 The temporary adjustment safety
valve helps with the adjustment process by providing relief to those troubled
producers by erecting temporary trade barriers.
Safeguards are designed to be such a safety valve,154 but AD has long
been “preferred” over safeguards for a number of reasons: (a) AD allows
only particular exporters to be picked out;155 (b) the injury standard for AD is
softer than it is for safeguards;156 and (c) AD does not have the onerous
requirements for an unforeseen event,157 compensation,158 and maximum
periods.159
150
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Id.
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See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 176.
153
Id.
154
Under Article XIX of the GATT, a country may take a “safeguard action” by suspending
GATT concessions where increases in imports “cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products.” GATT 1947, supra note
11, art. XIX (emphasis added); see also TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 48, at 425–27
(discussing “theoretical rationales for the safeguard regime”).
155
Unlike AD, safeguards must be applied to all countries equally. Article 2.2 of the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards (AS) provides that “[s]afeguard measures shall be applied to a
product being imported irrespective of its source.” Agreement on Safeguards art. 2.2, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter AS].
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Article 4.1(a) of the AS defines ‘serious injury’ as “a significant overall impairment in
the position of a domestic industry.” Id. art. 4.1(a). In US-Lamb, the Appellate Body (AB)
held that the standard of serious injury set forth in Article 4.1(a) of the AS is much higher than
the standard of material injury found in the ADA. Appellate Body Report, United States –
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and Australia, ¶ 124, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001).
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According to Article XIX of the GATT 1947, a safeguard measure can only be adopted
where serious injury or threat of serious injury occurs “as a result of unforeseen
developments.” See GATT 1947, supra note 11, art. XIX. The AB in Argentina-Footwear
held that Article XIX means that “developments which led to a product being imported in
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According to Finger, Ng, and Wangchuck, AD became “the developed
countries’ major safeguard instrument”—i.e., safety valve—by the 1990s.160
This situation did not change much even after adoption of the Agreement on
Safeguards in the Uruguay Round, which made safeguards arguably more
appealing.161 AD also gained popularity among developing countries after
the Uruguay Round.162 According to Wu’s empirical study on AD in China
and India, the need for safety valves seems to have provided some
motivation for initiating AD cases in at least some industries in both
countries.163
Wu’s study shows that, in both India and China, the industries that use
AD laws tend to bring cases in which a tariff cut was accompanied by a
sharp import surge.164 It is true that the safety valve model predicts that
more AD cases will be filed after a trade barrier is removed. However, this
does not necessarily mean that the need for a safety valve disappears after the
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to domestic producers must have been ‘unexpected.’ ” Appellate Body Report,
Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, ¶ 91, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14
1999) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear]. Article 2 of the AS states that a country may apply a
safeguard measure to a product only if “such product is being imported into its territory in
such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that
produces like or directly competitive products.” AS, supra note 155, art. 2.1. The AB in
Argentina-Footwear held that Article 2 of the AS means that “the increase in imports must
have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause ‘serious injury.’ ” (emphasis
added). Argentina-Footwear, ¶ 131.
158
Although Article XIX(3)(a) of the GATT 1947 states that a country can apply a
safeguard measure unilaterally, it also provides that the affected countries can suspend
“substantially equivalent” trade concessions against that country. GATT 1947, supra note 11,
art. XIX(3)(a). This provision “has been interpreted as establishing a right to compensation.”
TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 48, at 420.
159
Article 7.1 of the AS provides that a safeguard action cannot be maintained for a period
longer than four years unless the period is extended under Article 7.2. Article 7.2 provides
that the period may be extended if “the safeguard measure continues to be necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury and . . . there is evidence that the industry is adjusting.”
According to Article 7.3, “the total period of application of a safeguard measure,” including
the initial and extended periods, cannot exceed eight years. AS, supra note 155, arts. 7.1–7.3.
160
See J. Michael Finger et al., Antidumping as Safeguard Policy 4 (The World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper Series 2730, 2001).
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See Chad P. Brown, Why are Safeguards Under the WTO so Unpopular?, 1 WORLD
TRADE REV. 47, 47–49 (2002).
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See Wu, supra note 1, at 117–22.
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Id. at 138, 142.
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domestic producers completely adjust to the increased competition following
trade liberalization. Strategic trade theory suggests that governments often
adopt policies to encourage particular exports or to discourage particular
imports to promote or target certain industries that yield greater returns.165
Such targeting can be part of a greater scheme of industrial policies
incorporating even non-trade mechanisms, “such as low-interest loans and
government support for research and development [programs].”166 Hence,
the theory of strategic trade policy and the theory of industrial policy
question the validity of the traditional notion of static comparative advantage
and suggest that comparative advantage is in fact “dynamic.”167
The concept of dynamic comparative advantage suggests that domestic
producers can, from time to time, encounter unexpected increases in
competition caused by increased productivity of foreign producers. Such an
increase in competition might not be as sudden as a tariff cut but can be just
as injurious to the domestic producers because: (a) it cannot be planned as a
tariff cut can be planned, and (b) the increase in the productivity of the
foreign producers may continue for a long period. A government may want
to use a temporary adjustment safety valve to address the problem of
dynamic comparative advantage even after trade liberalization.
AD has at least two merits as a temporary adjustment safety valve against
shifting comparative advantage. First, unlike safeguards, the applicability of
which is contingent on a sudden influx of imports, AD deals with the low
prices of foreign goods, which are likely to be the first signal of foreign
competitiveness. Second, AD can be applied to those specific foreign
producers that have already achieved a strong comparative advantage.
Of course, the current AD regime is not a perfect safety valve because it
was never developed with that particular intent in mind.168 However, AD is
already used as an effective safety valve. Therefore once the role of AD as a
safety valve is formally recognized, it would evolve into an even better one.
D. Implications of the New Rhetoric
It might be surprisingly easy to incorporate the new rhetoric into WTO
law. For example, a change as small as replacing the word “condemned” in
165

See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 275; see also KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 96, at
275–96.
166
KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 96, at 270.
167
See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 276.
168
See Finger et al., supra note 160, at 10.
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GATT Article VI with a more neutral word, such as “addressed” or
“remedied,” can have a significant impact. It would also be a good idea to
move Article VI, or the portion that deals with AD, to near Article XIX,
which deals with temporary escape mechanisms.
A more radical but still attainable step would be replacing the word
“dumping” in GATT and ADA with more neutral terms such as
“international price-differentiation (IPD).” For example, Article VI would
read: “International price-differentiation (IPD) . . . is to be remedied if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry.” Of course,
then the word antidumping should be replaced, accordingly.
These amendments would not change any substantive laws. Therefore,
they might be accepted by most countries without much protest. However,
the impact of these changes will be enormous. First, they will eliminate the
derogatory connotation attached to dumping, which will then remove the
notion that countries have inherent rights in adopting AD policies. This will
then establish that AD is a form of protectionism that needs to be regulated
strictly. Once this is established, the problems associated with the lax legal
standards in the current AD regime will become more obvious, and proposals
will be made to address them. Those proposals will then be accepted more
readily because of the consensus formed by the new rhetoric. Thus, the
function of the rhetoric of AD as a guideline for good policymaking will be
restored.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Wu’s reform proposal to require explanation of the unfair trade practices
enabling dumping is founded on the legitimate concern that today’s AD laws
are consistently misused. AD has long been used as an ordinary means of
protectionism in many developed countries and is likely to be used this way
in developing countries such as China and India. However, the manner in
which AD is used in reality reflects the expectations of national
governments. Such expectations should be incorporated into the rhetoric of
AD, not denied. Wu’s proposal fails to address this fundamental problem
and affirms the traditional rhetoric of AD as a sanction against unfair trade
practices. Such rhetoric has never properly reflected the true intention of the
policymakers who invented AD. It is also irrelevant to the way AD is used
today. Furthermore, Wu’s reform proposal will introduce the highly
problematic and controversial concept of fairness into WTO law. This is
likely to create a new set of problems characterized by confusion and
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disagreement. Although Wu’s proposal, if implemented, might achieve
limited success by raising the bar for applications of AD, it is not the
ultimate solution.
A better approach to making AD a more manageable instrument requires
abandoning the old rhetoric based on the notion that dumping is unfair and
promoting a new rhetoric focusing on its role as a safety valve. The role of
AD as a political support safety valve and a temporary adjustment safety
valve is supported by the public choice theory, the strategic trade theory, the
industrial policy theory, and the concept of dynamic comparative advantage.
The new rhetoric would avoid the problematic concept of fairness and be
consistent with the expectations of national governments. The adoption of
the new rhetoric in WTO law might be surprisingly easy because it does not
deal with substantive law. However, once adopted, it would change how
people conceptualize AD and bring their attention to the problems associated
with the lax legal standards governing its use. Therefore, more proposals
will be made to prevent the abuse of AD. These proposals will then be
accepted more readily because of a rhetoric that affirms the protectionist
nature of AD. Hence, there will be a virtuous circle.

